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Bargaining and Discussion-Is It a Happy
Marriage?
BARBARA

W. DoERIwG*

Indiana passed its first public employee bargaining law in the 1973
legislative session.1 Like other states which have made the step towards
collective relations with public employees, 2 the Indiana law was adopted
only after considerable debate and a number of unsuccessful attempts.!
*B.A. 1965, Cornell University; M.S. 1969, N.Y.S.S.I.L.R., Cornell University;
Member, National Labor Arbitration Panel, American Arbitration Association; Member,
Labor Arbitration Panel, F.M.C.S.; Employment Relations Mediator, Indiana Education
Employment Relations Board. Opinions expressed in this article are not necessarily
those of the IEERB.
Ms. Doering has been a member of the ad hoc panel of mediators and fact-finders
for the New York State Public Employment Relations Board since June 1969. Her
analysis of teacher bargaining disputes under New York's Taylor Law appears in Impasse
Issues in Teacher Disputes Submitted to Fact Finding in New York, 27 AiP. J. (n.s.) 1

(1972).

The Indiana Education Employment Relations Act, IND. CODE §§ 20-7.5-1-1 to -14
(1973), IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 28-4551 to -4564 (Supp. 1974) [hereinafter referred to as
P.L. 217 or the Act]. Sections of the Act referred to are from the session law, Pub. L.
No. 217, [1973] Ind. Acts 1080, as amended, Pub. L. No. 1, § 5, [1974] Ind. Acts 3.
2 See BNA GovT EMpLOYEE REL. REP. [hereinafter cited as G.E.R.R.] 51:501-21
(Ref. File 1973) for a compilation of state bargaining statutes.
s Prior legislative attempts are discussed in Brickner, The Status of Public Employee
Bargaining,22 LAB. L.J. 492 (1971).
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This law, designed initially as a comprehensive statute, covered only
teachers in its enacted form. The final compromise, while borrowing in
many of its provisions from the experience of other states and the ACIR
Report of 1969,' is unique in its treatment of scope of bargaining and
in the dual obligation it imposes on the parties to bargain on certain
subjects and to discuss others.' While there is experience in other states
with narrow-scope bargaining laws for teachers,' and with "meet and
confer" laws,7 which are essentially "discussion" mandates,' only six
states besides Indiana require both discussion and bargaining, and only
two of these expressly make it an unfair practice to refuse to discuss
in good faith.9 Under Indiana's law the discussion mandate, although
4

ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIO-TfS, LABOR-MANAGEMENT
POLICIES FOR STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT (1969), excerpteJ in G.E.R.R. 51:101-23
(Ref. File 1970) [hereinafter referred to as ACIR STUDY]. Th! most apparent influence
of the ACIR Study is in the management rights provision. Con pare id. at 102 with IND.
CODE: § 20-7.5-1-6(b) (1973), IND. ANN. STAT. § 28-4556(b) (Supp. 1974).
5 IND. CODE §§ 20-7.5-1-3, -4, -5 (1973), IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 28-4553, -4554, -45.5
(Supp. 1974). See Note, Determining the Scope of Bargaining Under the Indiana Edu-

cation Employment Relations Act, 49 IND. L.J. 460, 462-69 (1974).
8
E.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.701 (Supp. 1974), as construed in Pennsylvania
Lab. Rel. Bd. v. State College Area School Dist., 9 Pa. Cmwlth. 229, [State College
Educ. Ass'n v. Pennsylvania Lab. Rd. Bd.] 306 A.2d 404 (1973). See also VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 16, § 2004 (Supp. 1974).
7E.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-5414 (1972), as construed in National Educ. Ass'n of
Shawnee Mission v. Board of Educ., 212 Kan. 741, 512 P.2d 425 (1973). Alaska, California, Delaware, Nebraska, and Washington have also adopted the "meet and confer"
approach. G.E.R.R. 51:501-21 (Ref. File 1973).
8
"Meet and confer in good faith" . . . means the obligation of both the public
employer and an employee organization to meet at reasonable times, to exchange
openly and without fear information, views, and proposals, and to strive to
reach agreement on matters relating to wages, hours, and such other terms and
conditions of employment as fall within the statutorily defired scope of the discussion. The resulting memorandum of understanding is sabmitted to a jurisdiction's governing body, and it becomes effective when the necessary implementary actions have been agreed to and acted on by pertinent executive and legislative officials.
ACIR STUDY, supra note 4, at 101.
9 The Pennsylvania bargaining law requires both collective bargaining and discussion. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 1101.701, 1101.702 (Supp. 1974). The employer retains
implementary discretion over the subjects of discussion: "any decisions or determinations
on matters so discussed shall remain with the public employer andI be deemed final on any
issue or issues raised." Id. § 1101.301(17). The duty to meet and discuss, id. § 1101.702,
can be enforced by unfair labor practice procedures. Id. § 1101,1201(9).
Montana, in its teacher negotiations statute, also requires both bargaining ("professional negotiations") on "salary, hours and other terms of employment," MONT. REV.
CODES ANN. § 75-6119 (1971), and "meet and confer" discussion on virtually all other
matters. Id. § 75-6118. It is an unfair practice to refuse to negotiate or meet and confer
in good faith, id. § 75-6120(c) ; however, since the act sets up no administrative board,
enforcement must be by judicial proceedings. Id. § 75-6125.
On the other hand, HAWAII REv. STAT. §§ 89-9(a), (c) (Supp. 1973) also requires
both bargaining and discussion, the latter duty extending to "all matters affecting employee relations, including those that are, or may be, the subject of a regulation promul-
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it does not require that any agreements made during discussion be included in the written contract, is nevertheless an affirmative obligation
which must be met in good faith, and procedural compliance is guaranteed under the unfair practice provisions.1
The Indiana Education Employment Relations Board (IEERB),
a three-member board appointed by the Governor, is charged with administering the Act.1 Under section 9 of the Act, 2 the Board may appoint mediators to assist the parties when they have reached an impasse,
and it may also appoint fact-finders to make recommendations on unresolved disputes over bargainable issues. Section 7 of the Act 8 makes
certain conduct of the parties of an unfair labor practice, and the IEERB
is empowered by section 9(e) 4 to appoint a hearing examiner to hear
either party's complaint that an unfair practice has been committed.
Both the Act's coverage of teachers only and its dual obligation to
bargain and to discuss will be subjects for review in the 1975 biennial
session of the General Assembly. 5 Since the restricted scope of the
gated by the employer . . . ." Id. § 89-9(c) ; yet the duty to confer is protected, if at
all, only by the umbrella prohibition that the employer shall not "[r]efuse or fail to com." Id. § 89-13 (a) (7).
ply with any provision of this chapter ...
Likewise, in Minnesota a "meet and confer" obligation is imposed over those educational policies of the school district not subject to bargaining, MiN. STAT. ANN. §§
179.65(3), 179.66(3), 179.63(18) (Supp. 1974), but the obligation is covered in the section on unfair labor practices only by an umbrella provision. Id. § 179.68(2).
Delaware, also sets up twin duties of, bargaining and conferral, DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
14, §§ 4008(a), (b) (Cum. Supp. 1970) ; but the obligation to confer is protected only
indirectly under a catch-all provision. Id. § 4009. In practical terms this omission is not
significant since the scope of bargaining is coextensive with the scope of discussion.
Compare id. § 4008(a) with id. § 4008(b).
Maine provides no statutory remedy for its separate duty to discuss. Bargaining
and discussion are both mandated, bargaining over the customary economic items and
conditions of employment, with discussion reciuired over matters of educational policy,
ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 965(1) (C) (1974), but the statute does not extend the
remedy of unfair labor practice complaints to the obligation to discuss, even under a general prohibition. See id. § 964. Unlike other states, Maine expressly prohibits bargaining over subjects reserved to discussion. Id. § 965(1) (C).
10 IND. CODE §§ 20-7.5-1-5, -7 (1973), ID. ANN. STAT. §§ 28-4555, -4557 (Supp.

1974).

IND. CODE § 20-7.5-1-9 (1973), IND. ANN. STAT. § 28-4559 (Supp. 1974).
The Board employs one researcher and four professional staff members who
serve as hearing officers in representation and unfair practice cases and who also serve as
mediators and fact-finders in impasse disputes. The Board maintains an ad hoc panel of
about 60 people around the state who are used in addition to the full time staff on mediation and fact-finding cases. Additionally, a dozen members of this panel have been
trained to serve as ad hoc hearing examiners.
121 d. See also IND. CODE §§ 20-7.5-1-12, -13 (1973), IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 28-4562,
-4563 (Supp. 1974).
1 IND. CODE § 20-7.5-1-7 (1973), IND. ANN. STAT.'§ 284557 (Supp. 1974).
14 ND. CODE § 20-7.5-1-9(e) (1973), IND. ANN. STAT. § 28-4559(e) (Supp. 1974).
31

See also note.25 infra.

15 The Indiana General Assembly meets in a long (61-day) session every two years,
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bargaining obligation is perhaps the most controversial item in the law
as it was enacted,1" the experience under this statute after one round

of bargaining should be examined and recorded before the law itself
is reviewed by the legislature. The question of scope, after all, is probably the major reason for treating teachers separately from other public
employees, and it is certainly worth examining the experience if other
employees are to be added either under this statute or under a separate

statute.
Under Indiana's Public Law 217 the scope of the collective relationship is now broken down by subject matter under the bargaining
and discussion mandates.1 7 There is a duty to bargain18 and enter into
a contract on a limited number of mandatory items (economic items,
hours, and possibly grievance procedure)," and a duty to discuss and
exchange "meaningful input"20 on a much broader range of additional
items (working conditions and some policy items)." Moreover, the
parties may bargain discussible items if both parties wish to do so.22
and on the off year a short (30-day) session is held to take care of emergency legislation. Major changes are usually handled only in the long biennil session. See Ism. ANN.
STAT. §§ 2-2.1-1-2, -3 (Code ed. Supp. 1974).
16 See Brickner, supra note 3. Generally, scope of bargaining problems occur more
frequently in professional negotiations than in situations traditonally governed by the
National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1970).
[T]here are seldom any significant differences over scop -. of negotiations as
among blue-collar workers and other nonprofessionals in either the private or
public sectors. Among salaried professionals, however, the conflict is both fundamental and sharp. Public management correctly perceixes that the salaried
professional poses a greater threat to managerial prerogatives than other public
employee groups. . . . Public management, in stressing the need for limiting
the scope of negotiations, is reasserting a strong desire to maintain complete
control over matters of fundamental policy.
U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, SCOPE OF BARGAINING IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR-CONCEPTS AND
PROBLEmiS 7"-8 (1972).
17 IND. CODE §§ 20-7.5-1-3, -4, -5 (1973), IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 28-4553, -4554, -4555
(Supp. 1974). See generally Note, supra note 5, at 462-69.
18 Defined in section 2(n) of the Act, IND. CODE § 20-7.5-1-2(n) (1973), IND. ANN.
STAT. § 28-4552(n) (Supp. 1974).
19 "[S]alary, wages, hours, and salary and wage related frbige benefits. A contract
may also contain a grievance procedure . . . ." Iun. CODE § 20-7.5-1-4 (1973), IND.
ANN. STAT. § 284554 (Supp. 1974).
0 Defined in section 2(o) of the Act, IND. CODE § 20-7.5-1-2(o) (1973), IND. ANN.
STAT. § 28-4552(o) (Supp. 1974).
'. IND. CODE § 20-7.5-1-5 (1973), IND. ANN. STAT. § 28-4555 (Supp. 1974):
Working conditions, other than those provided in Section 4; curriculum development and revision; textbook selection; teaching methods; selection, assignment
or promotion of personnel; student discipline; expulsion or supervision of students; pupil-teacher ratio; class size or budget appropriatiois ....
See also Note, supra note 5, at 462-63.
.. 2 In cases where there were 1972-1973 agreements, all items included therein are
grandfathered into the bargaining obligation regardless of whether some are only discussible under P.L. 217. The proviso in section 5 (a) states: "Proxided, however, That any
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The bargaining mandate differs from discussion in that agreements
reached in discussion need not be reduced to writing or included in a
contract,23 and that in substantive disputes occuring in discussion the
parties are not required to use the impasse procedures. Nevertheless,
lack of good faith in meeting either obligation may be the subject of an
unfair practice.2
It is the purpose of this study first to look at the practical impact
of this dual obligation on the structure of employment relations, and
second, to shed some light on the meaning of "good faith discussion"
and what the parties may be required to do in order to meet this obligation. The problems which occurred in the first year were both procedural
and substantive in nature. The procedural problems will be dealt with
first, since chronologically they occurred first, and as a practical matter,
many had to be resolved before substantive questions could even be
brought to hearing, much less go the full route to a decision. 8
PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS UNDER THE NEW LAW

The bargaining provisions of P.L. 217 took effect on January 1,
1974.17 Table bargaining"8 was mandated to start at least 180 days prior
to budget submission. 9 This would have been roughly February 12th.
items included in the 1972-1973 agreements between any employer school corporation and
the employee organization shall continue to be bargainable." IND. CODE § 20-7.5-1-5(a)
(1973),
IND. ANN. STAT. § 28-4555(a) (Supp. 1974).
28
IND. CODE § 20-7.5-1-2(o) (1973), IND. ANN. STAT. § 28-4552(o) (Supp. 1974).
2
4 Id.
25 "It shall be an unfair practice [to] . . . refuse to bargain collectively or dicuss . . . ." IND. CODE § 20-7.5-1-7(a) (1973), IND. ANN. STAT. § 28-4557(a) (Supp.
1974)2 (emphasis added).
GThe graphs and charts reproduced in the Appendix, infra, depict the change in
caseload from procedural problems at first to the more substantive questions later. Impasse problems have not been confined to urban school districts, nor to any particular
part of the state. See Appendix map.
27Although P.L. 217 took effect July 1, 1973, [1973] Ind. Acts 1096 (Pub. L. No.
217, § 4), the obligations of bargaining and discussion were expressly made effective only
on January 1, 1974. IND. CODE § 20-7.5-1-3 (1973), IND. ANN. STAT. § 28-4553 (Supp.
1974).
28 Table bargaining refers to actual negotiation of the contract. This should not be
confused with the duty to bargain collectively, which is a more general and ongoing obligation and which neither starts nor ends with the signing of the contract, but continues
with regard to any bargainable subject not covered nor expressly waived by the negotiation of the contract and, also, once a contract is signed, includes the obligation to implement the provisions of the contract in good faith.
29 Section 12 of the Act, IND. CODE § 20-7.5-1-12 (1973), IND. ANN. STAT. § 28-4562
(Supp. 1974), sets up a bargaining timetable, beginning 180 days before school budgets
must be completed, in order to coordinate the costs of the bargained contract with available school funding. This procedure works against the backdrop of an express prohibition against "any agreement that would place [the] employer in a position of deficit financing. . . " IND. CODE § 20-7.5-1-3 (1973), IND. ANN. STAT. § 28-4553 (Supp. 1974).
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Due to a backlog of representation cases,30 however, many districts did
not actually complete recognition procedures and start bargaining until
about mid-April. To put in perspective the discussion of bargaining
problems that follows, it should be noted that half of the 276 corporations involved in collective bargaining in 19741 were able to reach
agreement without any resort to impasse procedures. 2 By the end of
August, as the first schools were opening, all but 46 of the 300 potential
bargaining units33 were covered by contract. One hundred thirty-four
of the 230 contracts negotiated prior to September I" were the product
of the parties' efforts unaided by neutral assistance. In the 137 corporations where impasses developed, in many cases these occurred because
each side arrived at the table determined not to give up anything which
it felt entitled to get or retain under its reading of the Act.
The scope of bargaining and discussion, and the nature of the dual
80 See Appendix.
81 This is not an all-inclusive list, since three corporations were covered by multiyear contracts, and an additional 21 corporations did not bargain at all, either because no
exclusive representative of their certificated employees had been recognized or because
there was no request to bargain. These 24 districts are:
Not bargaining in 1974 :*
Carr Twp.
Valparaiso
Milan
Vernon Twp.
New Harmony
Whitley County (8 districts)
Northeast Dubois
North Montgomery
Salem (Washington)
Speedway
Springs Valley
Multi-year contracts:
Tippecanoe Valley
Fast Chicago
Turkey Run
Tri Creek
Union Twp. (Kewana)
Northwestern Shelby
* Note in two of the districts not bargaining in 1974 there were requests for
recognition by an employee organization. In both cases elections were held.
In North Montgomery the organization failed to poll a majority of unit employees. In Tippecanoe Valley there was a dispute about challenged ballots
which is awaiting resolution in court.
82 Since strikes are prohibited, impasses reached over bargainable or permissively
bargained items are subject to impasse procedures which includt mediation, followed if
necessary by fact-finding with recommendations, and additional mediation or fact-finding
as the IEERB deems appropriate. The parties may also voluntarily enter into binding
arbitration.
33Three hundred potential bargaining units are comprised of two special education
units and 298 regular units which include Porter County schools (six townships) as a
single unit and Cass-Dewey school (two townships) as a single unit, since in each case
bargaining was carried on for all the member schools with a single exclusive representative.
34 The number of contracts cited refers to the date of signing. There may in fact
have been other corporations which had completed bargaining -md reached a tentative
agreement, but whose contracts were not yet ratified or signed.
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obligation very quickly became major areas of contention. Many of the
employee organizations took the position that since negotiation of "discussible" items is permissive, all items should be discussed at the bargaining table and, if agreement is reached, included in the contract. Although some school corporations went along with this approach, at
least to the extent of dealing with all items at the bargaining table, many
took the position that the processes of bargaining and discussion should
be separate and distinct. To emphasize the distinction they appointed
both a bargaining team and a discussion team made up of different individuals. The bargaining team then steadfastly refused to talk about
anything other than mandatory items, lest at some later date the teachers
seek inclusion of permissive items in the contract on the grounds that
the scope of bargaining had been voluntarily expanded.3 5
Frustrations with collective bargaining ran especially high in corporations where the parties literally spent months talking about what
they were not going to talk about. Disputes were eventually referred to
the IEERB,"8 either in the form of impasses or unfair practices. Although the parties are not required to submit disputes over discussible
items to the impasse procedure,"7 of necessity mediators must handle
questions of scope of bargaining and differentiation between mandatory
and permissive areas of bargaining if these problems stand in the way
of settlement of those issues which must be negotiated. The law contemplates and in fact mandates this function to the mediator in section
12(b). 88
Since mediation is a confidential procedure,"9 there is no record of
35
In fact, such a charge was eventually filed (U-74-40-3625), alleging that exchange
of proposals on preparation time constituted permissive bargaining, and, having exchanged
proposals, the school employer was estopped from refusing to bargain to agreement on
this item. The charge, however, was dismissed without hearing by the IEERB since
there can be no wrongful refusal to bargain unless there is a duty to bargain the item in
the first place.
36 IND. CODE § 20-7.5-1-11 (1973), IND. ANN. STAT. § 28-4561 (Supp. 1974) (unfair practices) ; IND. CODE § 20-7.5-1-13 (1973), IND. ANN. STAT. § 28-4563 (Supp. 1974)
(impasse procedure).
37 Section 2(o) of the Act, IND. CODE § 20-7:5-1-2(o) (1973), IND. ANN. STAT. §
28-4552(o) (Supp. 1974), provides in part: "A failure to reach an agreement on any
matter of discussion shall not require the use of any part of the impasse procedure, as
provided in Section 13 [IND. CoDE § 20-7.5-1-13 (1973), IND. ANN. STAT. § 28-4563
(Supp. 1974)]." Cf. id. § 12(b), IND. CODE § 20-7.5-1-12(b) (1973), IND. ANN. STAT. §
28-4562(b) (Supp. 1974) : "[T]he board shall appoint a mediator if either party declares
an impasse either in the scope . . . or on the substance of any item to be bargained collectively." (Emphasis added.)

88 Id.
89 It is the intent of the legislation that the mediation process shall be confidential
in nature. The mediator shall not be subject to the subpoena power of courts or
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what transpired with regard to settlement of scope disputes. Of III
mediated cases, however, 70 were settled. Forty-one went to fact-finding
and of these 41, 18 were settled without report--essentially through
additional mediation by the fact-finder. Moreover, of the 26 cases which
went to fact-finding without benefit of prior mediation,4" two were withdrawn and 13 were settled short of report. Thus -mediation accounted
for settlements in 101 of 137 cases. 1 It would seem that mediators and
fact-finders were persuasive in getting the parties to reach some agreement on how to handle discussible items and the scope of bargaining at
least for the purposes of finalizing a contract. 2
One factor which may have contributed to the large number of
mediated settlements is the exception of permissive items from the
formal fact-finding procedure. Since the fact-finder's report is restricted to bargainable items only, there was no advantage in holding
other administrative agencies of the state regarding the subjects discussed as a
part of the mediation process.
Section 13(a) of the Act, IND. CODE § 20-7.5-1-13(a) (1973), IND. ANN. STAT. § 284563(a) (Supp. 1974).
40 At its meeting of July 18th, the IEERB decided in view of the very short time
remaining prior to budget submission that:
The Chairman of the IEERB be given the authority on due consideration of
each case to send in a fact finder when a mediator is requested between now
and budget submission time. The fact finder has the authority to mediate if
both parties agree on this process.
Minutes of the IEERB, July 18, 1974, at 1 [on file with the INDIANA LAW JOURNAL].
41 Three additional cases were filed but withdrawn. Of the 137 cases, 101 settlements
account for a little over 73%. Comparing this settlement rate with statistics from New
York we find that from the effective date of the Taylor Law in September 1967 through
1972 there was an overall rate of 49.8% of impasses settled in mediation, plus an additional 26.0% settled (no report) in fact-finding, or a total of 75.8% settled through
mediation. In school cases only, the statistics, which-were not kept separately until
1969, show that the rate of settlement has been somewhat lower than for all public sector cases:
(New York)

1969

1970

1971

1972

School Impasses
Withdrawn

498
-25

440
-14

533
-5

619
-1

473

426

528

618

198
-44

237
+46

239
+66

221
±145

242

283

305

366

Mediated Settlement
Fact-finding, No Report

% Settled

51%

66%

579%

59%

Letter from Jack A. Ginsburg, Associate Economist, Research Div., N.Y. State PERB,
to Barbara W. Doering, Jan. 11, 1973 [on file with the author].
42 The actual handling of discussion is yet to come, and it is anyone's guess whether
it will solve more problems than it creates, or vice versa.
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out on dearly permissive items. In cases involving issues which one
party claimed were bargainable and the other party claimed were just
discussible, fact-finders were faced with the substantive problem of
deciding their own jurisdiction in order to know whether or not to
offer a recommendation. The two most common of these issues were
the definition of "hours" and the question whether the grievance procedure, mentioned among the section 4 "Subjects of Bargaining," ' was
meant to be a mandatory subject. The fact-finders' recommendations in
these areas will be discussed later, along with other substantive interpretations of scope.
THE DUAL OBLIGATION AND UNFAIR PRACTICE DECISIONS

In cases where no accommodation could be reached on the distinction between mandatory and permissive items or where bargaining was
completely stalled, the unfair practice route was followed." Before
analyzing those hearing examiners' decisions that ruled upon the bargainability of specific items, we will look first at those decisions which
discussed the nature of the obligations in terms of what is procedurally
necessary in order that the obligation be met.

The Nature of the Obligation
The first decision which speaks to the nature of the two obligations
was issued July 5, 1974 in the Tippecanoe case. 5 This case involved an
48 Section 4, IND. CODE § 20-7.5-1-4 (1973), IND. ANN. STAT. § 28-4554 (Supp. 1974),
states in part: "A contract may also contain a grievance procedure culminating in final
and binding arbitration of unresolved grievances . . . ." It is unclear whether the
"may" is to be read with only the culmination in arbitration or with the whole concept
of grievance procedure. If the whole concept was meant to be permissive, one would
expect to find it in section 5, not section 4. Note, supra note 5, at 462 n.16.
44 The hearing of unfair practice charges is commenced with the filing, under oath,
by any employee or employer, of a complaint specifying the section of the Act allegedly
violated, and the facts constituting the offense. The Board, upon receipt of the complaint, notifies the person or organization against whom the complaint is brought. A
hearing examiner may be appointed, and may take testimony and render findings of fact,
and the Board may issue enforcement orders. IND. CODE § 20-7.5-1-11 (1973), IND. ANN.
STAT. § 28-4561 (Supp. 1974). Judicial review is provided as under the Indiana Administrative Adjudication Act, IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 4-22-1-1 to -30 (Code ed. 1974). Id. A
refusal to bargain over items claimed to be beyond the scope of mandatory bargaining
can be tested under the substantive prohibitions against unfair practices in sections
7(a) (5) and 7(b) (3), IND. CODE §§ 20-7.5-1-7(a) (5), -7(b) (3) (1973), IND. ANN.
STAT. §§ 28-4557(a) (5), -4557(b) (3) (Supp. 1974).
45 Bobbe June Blom v. Tippecanoe School Corp., [Unfair Practice] Case No. U-7415-7865 (IEERB,July 5, 1974). [Unfair practice decisions and fact-finders' reports of'
the IEERB have not yet been published. Board practice is to distribute copies of the
findings only to the parties. Copies of all unfair practice decisions and fact-finders' reports are on file with the IEERB, State Office Building, Indianapolis; in addition, a com-
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alleged refusal to bargain and to discuss. Although several issues were
in dispute, the central problem was that the parties held different positions on what constitutes good faith discussion.
The initial dispute revolved around what was to be done with
agreements on discussible items. Although the parties had not yet discussed the merits of any issues or reached any agreements, they had spent
a great deal of time debating what should be done with such agreements
if and when they were reached. The employee organization took the
position that at least some of the agreements on discussible items should
be included in the contract. It relied on a copy of a letter from the Chairman of the IEERB written in January to the Charles A. Beard School
Corporation.4 The letter indicated that although the parties are not
required to enter into a contract on discussible items, in view of the interrelated nature of some discussible and bargairable items and the
necessary give-and-take of bargaining, the IEERB would be surprised
to see a contract which did not include some discussible items. The
Tippecanoe School Corporation disagreed with this view and wrote for,
and eventually received, its own letter answering more specific questions
with regard to treatment of discussibles" This letter indicated that the
parties could record or acknowledge agreements on discussible items in
any way that was practicable and agreeable. It listed some of the various ways other corporations had devised for handling such agreements
and encouraged the parties to work out their own solution.
The hearing examiner held that regardless of the final form the
agreements assume, the parties are obligated to disuss the issues on
their merits in a meaningful way with a view towards jointly resolving
the issue or problem. The hearing examiner noted that more was required from the school board than the following two courses of action:
1) merely listen and ask a few questions for clarification, if clarification
is not then used to try to reach some mutual uriderstanding; 2) ask for
specific local examples, investigate, and take unilateral action on those
cited, meanwhile refusing to discuss any items which are not specifically
illustrated by local problems. While there is nothing wrong with clarification, investigation, and action to correct inequities, the obligation to
discuss is mutual and requires positive contributions from both sides. 8
plete set of all fact-finders' reports for 1974, and copies of the unfair practice decisions
discussed in this article, are on file with the INDIANA LAW JoURNA L.]
48 Letter from Franklin K. DeWald to James R. Kellam, Jan. 11, 1974.
47 Letter from Franklin K. Dekrald to K.L. Thayer, May 9, 1974.
48 In rejecting the employer's approach of "just listen," the h~aring examiner pointed
out:
Sec. 2(o), the definition of the word "discuss," indicates that the parties are
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It is not a one-way street, and even though written agreements are not
required, items which have been investigated or clarified ought to be
brought back to the table for resolution or at least for explanation and
discussion of the employer's views once the employer is acquainted with
the facts.
Effectuation of the Obligation
In addition to exploring the meaning of "good faith discussion," the
Tippecanoe decision also speaks to the effectuation of the two obligations, noting that the duty to discuss is not set in any time frame under
the law and therefore must be carried out on the request of either party
with regard to any discussible item(s) at any time unless the parties are
bound by an agreement on the item or by a procedural agreement for
handling discussion." Table bargaining is a less open-ended obligation,
since it is mandated to begin 180 days prior to budget stibmission, and
it continues until a contract is ratified. 0
This point is underlined and even more clearly elaborated in a subsequent hearing examiner's decision in the Baugo case" issued in
September. In the Baugo decision, in a footnote to the recommended
order, the hearing examiner put it this way:
The obligations to bargain and to discuss are continuing in nature.
Of course, to the extent that any matter is dealt with in a contract the obligation to discuss or bargain it is met for the term
of the contract. If either a bargainable or discussable item is
subject to the grievance procedure, the obligation to bargain or
discuss can be met during the contract term (or outside it) if the
parties, by contract or otherwise, agree to submit the matter2 to
the grievance procedure and use the procedure in good faith.1
The implication here is that the IEERB might stay proceedings in
onutually obligated

"...

to provide meaningful input, to exchange points of

view . . . While the parties are not required to agree to a proposal or make
concessions, meaningful input is more than just listening and taking unilateral
actions. "Input" refers to the discussion process; each side is required to put
something in to it.
Bobbe June Blom v. Tippecanoe School Corp., [Unfair Practice] Case No. U-74-15-7865
(IEERB, July 5, 1974), at 10 (emphasis in original).
49 Id. at 4.
50Id., citing section 12 of the Act, IIn. CoDE § 20-7.5-1-12 (1973), IND. ANN. STAT.
§ 28-4562 (Supp. 1974).
51 Consolidated cases Sarah Borgman & Board of School Trustees of the Baugo
Community School Corp., Sharon Poyser & Board of School Trustees of the Baugo Community School Corp., [Unfair Practice] Cause No. U-74-11-2260-12; Donald Bacher &
Board of Trustees of the Baugo Community School Corp., [Unfair Practice] Cause No.
U-74-11-2260-11 (IEERB, Sept. 5, 1974) [hereinafter referred to as Baugo].
62 Id.at 17 n.*.
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future cases where the parties have submitted or are in the process of
submitting the disputed item as a grievance.
Specific Examples
While the Tippecainoe decision and the later Baiugo decision outline
the essential nature of the two obligations, the duty to discuss is given
further definition in two discharge cases"' where the hearing examiners
found that the school employers had failed to meet their duty to discuss
before terminating the complainants. In the Delph,' case" the employer
was also found to have improperly discriminated against the complainant
because of his attempts to participate, as president of the employee association, in discussions relating to the granting of tenure to a colleague.
The hearing examiner found that the employer had an obligation to
discuss the promotion to tenure of the colleague with the exclusive
representative as well as an obligation to discuss teaching methods, assignment, and student discipline with the complainant, before taking
action in his case.
In the other discharge case, the Baugo decision, the hearing examiner pointed out that disputes relating to evalution and evaluation
procedures should be settled by the parties themselves by engaging in
good faith discussion. He noted:
The primary responsibility to hear such problem; rests with the
school board. This has always been true and P.L. 217, Sec. 6(b)
reaffirms this duty and power.
The General Assembly in passing P.L. 217 has demanded that
school [boards] take on the obligation of hearing from both sides
before they exercise their Sec. 6 powers.55
Other unfair practice complaints which bear or. the effectuation of
the two obligations (rather than the substance of the scope of bargaining) have also been filed-some simply charging a, general refusal to
bargain without much elaboration,"8 and a few more specifically alleging
1) delays caused either by unwillingness to meet or unavailability of
professional negotiators, 2) refusal to provide information needed for
sId., and Robert Brothers & Board of School Trustees of the Delphi Community
School Corp., [Unfair Practice] Case -No.U-74-17-0755 (IEERB, Aug. 21, 1974).
" Id.
55
Baugo at 13-14.
58 Roughly 20 complaints alleging general refusal to bargain were filed. Eighteen
were withdrawn upon settlement of the dispute, and two remain open as of December 16.

1974.

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 50:284

negotiations, and 3) bad faith in the ratification process.
These charges typically have been settled or withdrawn prior to
hearing. Two cases57 charging refusal to provide information were
both settled and withdrawn prior to hearing. One charge of bad faith
in a failure to recommend a negotiated agreement for ratification 8 was
resolved by agreement and a consent order. The question of delays
went to hearing in Tippecanoe and in one other case.59 In both cases a
pattern of delay was evident, although in neither case was the pattern
dearly deliberate, more probably due to inexperienced negotiators. A
remedy of more frequent meetings was ordered in Tippecanoe by the
hearing examiner, and in the other case the parties agreed in a consent
order to that same remedy.
Remedies
In both the Delphi and Baugo cases, where a refusal to discuss
section 5 items prior to termination was found, the hearing examiners
recommended that the IEERB order the reinstatement of the complainant as a remedy. Explaining why reinstatement was ordered, the hearing examiner in the Delphi case pointed out that failure to reinstate
after a finding of discrimination based upon the exercise of protected
rights would be a failure of the IEERB to enter necessary orders to
carry out the intent of the Act. 6 1 In the Baugo decision the hearing
examiner further elaborated on the remedy and related it to the failure
to discuss:
The NLRB and other labor boards have always remedied the
taking of unilateral action by employers without bargaining by
restoring the status quo ante as nearly as possible. That remedy
is appropriate also in a case where a school board unilaterally reassigns a teacher or fails to renew one without meeting its obligation to discuss. When handed a fait accompli, the teacher['s] right
to discuss is destroyed unless the decision is reversed and discussion
is permitted before it is made again."
57 Glenn Gamble v. Griffith School Corp., [Unfair Practice] Case No. U-74-25-4700
(IEERB, withdrawn July 5, 1974); Louise Cogan v. Northwest Ind. Special Educ.,
[Unfair Practice] Case No. U-74-52-4720a (IEERB, withdrawn Sept. 30, 1974).
58 East Allen County Schools v. East Allen Educators Ass'n, [Unfair Practice] Case
No. U-74-42-0255 (IEERE, Consent Order Oct. 1, 1974).
5
9 Bobbe June Blom v. Tippecanoe School Corp., [Unfair Practice] Case No. U-7415-7865 (IEERB, July 5, 1974) ; Gerald C. Bowell v. Lawrenceburg Community Schools,
[Unfair Practice] Case No. U-74-5-1620 (IEERB, Consent Order Apr. 18, 1974).
60 Robert Brothers & Board of School Trustees of the Delphi Community School
Corp., [Unfair Practice] Case No. U-74-17-0755 (IEERB, Aug. 21, 1974), at 8-9.
61 Baugo at 14.
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It should be noted that both of the discharge cases are currently
under appeal. 2 The full Board (IEERB) has not yet heard or acted
upon these appeals. The Tippecanoe decision, which ordered the parties
to meet more frequently and to bargain and discuss in good faith, was
not appealed and thus after 20 days automatically became an order of
the Board under section 322.1 of the Board's rules and regulations."3
SUBSTANCE OF SCOPE-WHICH ITEmS ARE WHICH?

Unit Determinations and Scope
Before bargaining had even begun it had becn determined in the
representation cases that extracurricular duties are bargainable under
"wages [and] hours."'" The question arose in the context of the exclusion of supervisors from the bargaining unit, and specifically in the
question of supervisory status for head coaches and athletic directors.
62Both cases are being appealed, and the remedy may be the central issue in each.
A recent decision in another state may serve as precedent. In Pennsylvania Lab. Re].
Bd. v. Board of School Directors of the Upper Merion Area School Dist., [Unfair
Practice] Case No. PERA-C-2015-E (Pa. Lab. Rel. Bd., Sept. 15, 1972) [on file with
the

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL],

the issue was whether the school board had committed an

unfair practice in unilaterally changing the contracting period from 12 to ten months,
without first discussing the change, as required under the meet-and-confer requirement
in Pennsylvania's bargaining act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.702 (Supp. 1974). The
PLRB recognized that the employer's action was in an area saved to its discretion by the
statute's management rights provision, but held that the meet-and-confer requirement
extended to areas covered by the management rights provision.
The purpose of [the meet and confer obligation] is to allow for the full presentation and discussion of [matters of inherent managerki policy that affect
hours and wages] so that a result may be reached most compatible to the interests of both parties and in furtherance of the policies of the Act. . . . Unilaterally taking such an action and then presenting the complainant with an opportunity to discuss it does not satisfy the obligation to meet and confer ....
Upper Merion, supra, at 4. The remedy ordered by the Board in :luded the "[r]eturn [of]
those employes whose jobs or salary was affected by the unilaleral action to the status
quo existing prior to the unilateral action." Id. at 8.
68 Section 321.1 of the Rides states:
Within 20 days, or within such further period as the Chairman may allow, from
the date of transfer to the Board, any party may file exceptions to the hearing
examiner's findings and conclusions, or to any other part of the record or proceedings.
Section 322.1 states:
In the event no timely or proper exceptions are filed as herein provided, the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the hearing examiner as contained in
his decision shall automatically become the decision and orde!r of the Board and
become its findings, conclusions, and order and all objections and exceptions
thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes.
IEERB Rules & Regulations at 20-21, reprinted in 555 G.E.R.R. E-1, E-7 (Current Rep.
May 20, 1974).
64 Section 4 of the Act mandates bargaining over "salary, wages, hours, and salary
and wage related fringe benefits." IND. CODE § 20-7.5-1-4 (1973), IND. ANN. STAT. § 284554 (Supp. 1974).
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In the first unit determination issued, 5 the IEERB hearing officer held
that even though coaching or other extracurricular functions could be
separated from teaching duties, the Act covers any condition arising
out of the employment relationship without regard to whether it is
curricular or extracurricular. Thus, coaching and extracurricular duties
constitute bargaining unit work. On that basis supervisors of that work
were excluded from bargaining units, and on the same basis extracurricular pay and hours were deemed obviously bargainable 6
Fact-Finders' Recommendations and Scope Questions
It was noted earlier that fact-finders, because they make recommendations solely on bargainable subjects,67 must on occasion draw some

conclusions about the scope of bargaining and the extent of their own
jurisdiction. Fact-finding reports and recommendations, of course, are
only advisory opinions, and neither the parties nor the IEERB8 are
bound to accept these recommendations as precedent. Nevertheless,
since the reports may have had some impact in the resolution of disputes, and since it was apparent that many disputes were resolved in
these advisory proceedings, the fact-finders' opinions on negotiability
are offered here as an indication of the views of those who, as members
of the IEERB's ad hoc panel,6 9 were active in the dispute resolution
process.
65

In re Kokomo Unit Determination, [Representation] Case No. R-73-2-3500
(IEERB, Nov. 8, 1973).
66 Section 3 of the Act, which sets up the duty to bargain collectively, extends coverage to "school employees." IND. CODE § 20-7.5-1-3 (1973), IND. ANN. STAT. § 28-4553
(Supp. 1974). The term "school employee" is defined in section 2(e) to exclude "school
employee supervisors," IND. CODE § 20-7.5-1-2(e) (1973), IND. ANN. STAT. § 28-4552(e)
(Supp. 1974) ; and "supervisor" is defined in part (h) of the same section, first, by function ("authority . . . to hire, transfer [etc.]; responsibility to direct school employees . . . ; or effectively to recommend the action set out in these categories"), and
second, by title ("superintendents, . . . principals and vice-principals or department
heads who have responsibility for evaluating teachers"). IND. CODE § 20-7.5-1-2(h)
1974).
(1973),
67 InD. ANN. STAT. § 28-4552(h) (Supp.
See notes 37-38 supra & text accompanying.
68 It should be noted that under section 13(e), IND. CODE § 20-7.5-1-13(e) (1973),
IND. ANN. STAT. § 28-4563(e) (Supp. 1974), the IEERB may also make additional findings and recommendations based upon information in the report or in its own possession.
After ten days it must release the fact-finder's report with or without additional findings
of its own.. In practice, it does not usually modify the interpretation of the facts, since
the recommendations are advisory, and in any case the IEERB has not heard the parties'
presentation. It does occasionally review jurisdictional questions, and in two cases added
the modification that the report should not be taken as precedent for other cases.
69 The IEERB initially received over 100 applications for its ad hoc panel of mediators and fact-finders. After screening these applications, the Board invited some 60
people to a three-day training seminar in February 1974. Later in May, June, and July,
one-day briefing sessions were held.
One hundred eleven mediation cases were handled. Staff handled 22 of these, and
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The two major issues dealt with by fact-finders were the definition
of what may be included as bargainable under "hours" and whether or
not a grievance procedure is a mandatory subjec:t of bargaining. In
addition, a few fact-finders spoke to the bargainability of such items
as class size, job posting, due process in teacher dismissal, maintenance
of standards, no-strike clauses, PTO/PTA as a required activity, and
summer school.
Class size, due process, maintenance of standards, and no-strike
clauses were all found to be subjects of discussion rather than of bargaining, and no recommendations were made. Job posting was found to be
discussible by one fact-finder 7 ' and bargainable by another 7 -- although
in the first case, since the employer submitted its position on the merits
without arguing bargainability, the fact-finder made a recommendation
assuming willingness to bargain under the permissive language in section 5. Additionally, two fact-finders72 found preparation time, attendance at PTO/PTA meetings, use of sick days in summer school, and
rights of the employee association to be proper subjects of bargaining.
In two other cases73 where questionable items were raised, one factfinder, noting that the parties were substantially in agreement, went
ahead and recommended that the parties include their agreement in the
contract, while the other fact-finder found the questionable items not
to be significant to the impasse and declined to make any recommenda74
tions.
With regard to the interpretation of "hours" as a mandatory (barthe remainder were handled by 39 of the ad hoc panelists. Thirty of the panelists had
more than one case.
There were 67 cases which -went to fact-finding. Only tvo of these were handled
by staff. The remaining 65 were handled by 41 of the ad hoc panelists. These were not
necessarily the same 39 who had served as mediators, since 11 who had had mediation
cases for one reason or another did not handle fact-finding cases, and 12 who had not
mediated were used in fact-finding. Of those who handled fact-finding cases, only 15
had more than one case.
Thus, in the first year, 51 ad hoc panelists gained experien:e in mediation and factfinding under the impasse procedures of P.L. 217.
70 Metropolitan School Dist. of Washington Twp. & Washngton Twp. Educ. Ass'n,
[Impasse Fact-Finding] Case No. F-74-16-5370 (IEERB, July 31, 1974).
7'New Prairie United School Corp. & New Prairie Classroom Teachers Ass'n,
[Impasse Fact-Finding] Case No. F-74-35-4805 (IEERB, Aug 21, 1974).
72 Id., and North Knox School Corp. & North Knox Classroom Teachers Ass'n,
[Impasse Fact-Finding] Case No. F-74-44-4315 (IEERB,Sept. 13, 1974).
78 Huntington County Community School Corp. & Huntington Community Classroom Teachers Ass'n, [Impasse Fact-Finding] Case No. F-74-37-3625 (fEERB, Aug. 20,
1974); and East Noble School Corp.. & East Noble Classroom Teachers Ass'n, [Impasse
Fact-Finding] Case No. F-74-63-6060 (IEERB, Sept. 5, 1974).
74Id. at 2, 3, 4. Section 13(b) states in part: "The fact-Jander . . . may restrict
his findings to those issues which he determines significant . . ." IND. CODE § 20-7.51-13(b) (1973), IND. ANN. STAT. § 28-4563(b) (Supp. 1974).

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 50:284

gainable) subject, there was a variety of opinion. Some fact-finders
took guidance from an IEERB statement on this subject which appeared in the minutes of the July 18, 1974 meeting." This statement
was later rescinded at the next Board meeting on August 13 in favor
of a case-by-case approach through the unfair practice procedures.7
Based upon the July 18th statement, two fact-finders found preparation
time to be discussible rather than b'argainable as a matter of "hours"7
and therefore declined to make any recommendation on the issue. Two
other fact-finders78 ignored or were unaware of the July 18th statement
and found the subject bargainable, offering recommendations on it.
In addition to preparation time, the school calendar was raised as
an item possibly negotiable under "hours." One fact-finder dealt with
this to the extent of finding that in addition to the number of days to
be worked, the starting and ending dates of the school year should be
negotiated because of the teachers' legitimate concern with summer
employment and summer courses."
With regard to negotiability of grievance procedures, only ten of
30 fact-finders" were faced with the question, and all ten dealt with
75 Minutes of the IEERB, July 18, 1974, at 1-2 [on file with the INDIANA LAW JoURNAL].

76 Minutes of the IEERB, Aug. 13, 1974, at 1 [on file with the INDIAxA LAW JoUR-

Since the Board does not distribute its Minutes to the panelists, only those who
called in or who were informed by the parties would have been aware of the policy
statement
77 Mississinewa Community Schools Corp. & Mississinewa Teachers Ass'n, [Impasse
Fact-Finding] Case No. F-74-4-2885 (IEERB, July 29, 1974), at 10-11; Prairie Heights
Community School Corporation & Prairie Heights Educ. Ass'n, [Impasse Fact-Finding]
Case No. F-74-57-4515 (IEERB, Aug. 28, 1974), at 6-7.
78 New Prairie United School Corp. & New Prairie Classroom Teachers Ass'n,
[Impasse Fact-Finding] Case No. F-74-35-4805 (IEERB, Aug. 21, 1974); North Knox
School Corp. & North Knox Classroom Teachers Ass'n, [Impasse Fact-Finding] Case
No. F-74-44-4315 (IEERB, Sept. 13, 1974).
7
9 Kokomo-Center Twp. Consol. School Corp. & Kokomo Teachers Ass'n, [Impasse
Fact-Finding] Case No. F-74-7-3500 (IEERB, Aug. 1, 1974), at 9.
80Id.; Metropolitan School Dist. of Washington Twp. & Washington Twp. Educ.
Ass'n, [Impasse Fact-Finding] Case No. F-74-16-5370 (IEERB, July 31, 1974); North
Judson-San Pierre School Corp. & North Judson-San Pierre Classroom Teachers Ass'n,
[Impasse Fact-Finding] Case No. F-74-29-7515 (IEERB, Aug. 2, 1974); South Bend
Community School Corp. & National Educ. Ass'n-South Bend, [Impasse Fact-Finding]
Case No. F-74-31-7205 (IEERB, undated); Triton School Corp. & Triton Teachers
Ass'n, [Impasse Fact-Finding] Case No. F-74-48-5495 (IEERB, Aug. 18, 1974) ; Prairie
Heights Community School Corp. & Prairie Heights Educ. Ass'n, [Impasse Fact-Finding] Case No. F-74-57-4515 (IEERB, Aug. 28, 1974); Blackford County Schools &
Blackford County Teachers Ass'n, [Impasse Fact-Finding] Case No. F-74-36-0515
(IEERB, Aug. 31, 1974; Addendum Sept. 25, 1974) ; North Knox School Corp. & North
Knox Classroom Teachers Ass'n, [Impasse Fact-Finding] Case No. F-74-44-4315
(IEERB, Sept. 13, 1974); Indianapolis Public Schools & Indianapolis Educ. Ass'n,
[Impasse Fact-Finding] Case No. F-74-40-5385 (IEERB, Aug. 13, 1974); Porter
County Bd. of Educ. (Porter County Special Educ. Cooperative) & Special Educ.
NAL].
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this item as a bargainable subject and therefore made recommendations
with respect to disputed aspects of the grievance procedures. In the
Porter Co-op case8 ' the fact-finder addressed himself to the negotiability
question:
In the opinion of the Fact-Finder, the bargaining relationship
between the parties does not cease upon the signing of an agreement. Indeed, Section 1, paragraphs (a), (b), and (c) contemplates
an on-going relationship between school employee organizations
and their employers. The "acceptance of the principle and procedure of collective bargaining" (re: Sec. 1 (b)) is mandated by
the intent of the General Assembly of the State of Indiana in its
"preamble" to Public Law 217.
The collective bargaining relationship between the parties
requires some system of ameliorating disputes during the term of
the agreement.
It is exceedingly difficult to conclude from the language in
Section 1 and Section 4 of Public Law 217 that school employee
organizations should be required to look to a breach of contract
suit as a system for resolving differences regarding the interpretation and application of the contact to which they are a party. 2
Teachers Ass'n (Porter County),

[Impasse Fact-Finding]

Case No. F-74-41-0000

(IEERB, Aug. 29, 1974).
811d,
82 Id. at 8.
In discussing grievance procedures and arbitration, however, there appears to be
some confusion among the parties as to the extent of authority an arbitrator may exercise. The parties should be clear about the different kinds of arbitration employed in

public employment labor relations. See Gary Teachers Union, Local 4, AFT v. School
City, Ind. App. -, 284 N.E.2d 108 (1972) ; accord, East Chicago Teachers Union,
Local 511, AFT v. Board of Trustees, Ind. App. - , 287 N.E.2d 891 (1972),
where the court makes reference to the different kinds of arbitration.
There are two quite different types of labor arbitration: grievance arbitration, or "arbitration of rights," and impasse arbitration or "arbitration of interests." In dealing with public sector labor relations, it is particularly important to be aware of the differences between the two. . . . Grievance arbitration involves the determination of rights under an exiating contract by an
arbitrator acting in a judicial capacity. Impasse arbitration, on the other hand,
is utilized when the parties are unable to agree to the provisions of a labor
contract at the bargaining table; it is a substitute for the economic weaponry
of strikes and lockouts in the determination of what the contract rights of the
parties shall be.
R. SImTH, H. EDWARDS & R.T. CLARK, JR., LABOR RELATIONS LAW IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR: CASES AND MATERIALS 893 (1974) (emphasis in original). Section 4 of the Act

speaks only to arbitration in the grievance procedure, rather than impasse (interest)
arbitration. Impasse arbitration is also specifically condoned in section 13(c) of the
Act, IND. CODE § 20-7.5-1-13(c) (1973), Ian. ANN. STAT. § 23-4563(c) (Supp. 1974),
but only through voluntary agreement by the parties.
Thus, where the contract calls for final arbitration of grievances, the method is
merely a procedure for obtaining a fair and neutral interpreti.tion of the language to
which both parties have already agreed. The fact-finder in the PrairieHeights case

spoke to this issue:
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Substantive Scope as Determined in Unfair Practices
There were two unfair practice complaints filed for refusal to bargain in specific areas which may come under the definition of "hours."
These two cases concern the school calendar88 and preparation time."'
The impact of these cases, however, on this year's bargaining was minimal since the hearing examiners' decisions were not issued until September 10th and September 23d respectively.
In the calendar case (Fairfield)8" the issue was negotiability of the
dates on the school calendar. The parties agreed that daily working
hours or the number of days for which teachers would be paid were
negotiable. Only the question of mandatory bargaining of starting and
ending dates and allocation of unpaid vacation days within the calendar
were at issue.8" The employer had agreed to discuss these issues, but
was unwilling to bargain over them or to include them in the contract.
The hearing examiner found that the General Assembly probably
did not intend to mandate bargainihg on these questions of calendar,
and in view of the competing interests of personnel not in the bargaining
unit, patrons, and the community at large, he found collective bargaining
an inappropriate method of dealing with the questions involved."1
Nevertheless, he did find that both questions were proper subjects for
discussion. An amicus curiae brief which argued that setting the calendar
is an inherent management right and neither bargainable nor discussible
*wasrejected. This case was appealed to the full Board, and the IEERB's
In grievance arbitration, the arbitrator does not formulate policy or contractual
language; he does not change the contract; he simply interprets the agreement
that the parties have previously negotiated and agreed to. . . . This process does
not usurp the power or authority of the Corporation to formulate policy or
negotiate a collective agreement. The arbitrator's only function is to resolve
the grievance when all else has failed.
Prairie Heights Community School Corp. & Prairie Heights Educ. Ass'n, [Impasse FactFinding) Case No. F-74-57-4515 (IEERB, Aug. 28, 1974), at 4. Note, then, that where
the contract does not cover permissive section 5 items, to permit binding arbitration of
disputed discussible items would be, in effect, impasse or interest arbitration-and should
be recognized
as such.
83
John Rouch v. Board of School Trustees of the Fairfield Community Schools,
[Unfair
Practice] Case No. U-74-7-2155 (IEERB, Sept. 10, 1974).
84
Huntington County Community School Corp. v. Huntington Community Classroom Teachers Ass'n, [Unfair Practice] Case No. U-74-34-3625 (IEERB, Sept. 23,
1974).
8
5 John Rouch v. Board of School Trustees of the Fairfield Community Schools
[Unfair Practice] Case No. U-74-7-2155 (IEERB, Sept. 10, 1974).
86 A secondary question was whether the teachers association could insist upon the
inclusion in the contract of a proviso that school policy would not be changed during the
period
of coverage, even if the substance were not itself bargainable.
87
Fairfield at 7-11.
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ruling appears in the Minutes of its October 31, 1974 meeting."8 The
Board held: "Daily hours and the total number of days to be worked
are negotiable items for collective bargaining. All other calendar items
are discussable."'
0 the hearing examiner
In the preparation time case (Huntington)"
rejected the contention that preparation time is comprehended within
either "salary and wage related fringe benefits" or "hours." He
pointed out:
Preparation and planning time obviously is not salary and because
it is not an emolument arising from the employment relationship,
it is not a wage.... A change in preparation or planning time
may result in a school employee subjectively perceiving that his
salary, wages, and related fringe benefits, [have] relatively changed
when they are compared to his employment, bvt this is because
the employment has changed and not the emoluments arising from
it91

The item "hours" concerns hours of employment not what work
will be performed during that time. The hours of employment [consist] of the number of the hours the school employee is going to
work and the plriods of time that the work will be performed.
The time which the work'is to be performed includes questions
of the starting time, the ending time and the time out from work
when the school employee is completely free from any assignment.
The issue of preparation and planning concerns an issue of
assignment in that it deals with the question of what work will be
performed and not the issue
of what hours the teacher has em2
ployment responsibilities.
The hearing examiner therefore found that it was a refusal to bargain
on the part of the employee organization when it refused to enter into a
contract which did not include a clause on preparation time, since preparation time is not a mandatory subject of bargaining under P.L. 217
(It is discussible as a working condition.) s In so ruling, he notes that
to propose and to demand to bargain a permissive item, or to offer it as
88 Minutes

of the IEERB, Oct. 31, 1974, on file with the INDrIAA LAW JOURNAL.

The Board's Decision and Order was issued Nov. 22, 1974.
court review on Dec. 13, 1974.

'The complainant filed for

89
Id.
90
Huntington County Community School Corp. v. Huntingtcn Community Classroom
Teachers Ass'n, [Unfair Practice] Case No. U-74-34-3625 (IEERB, Sept. 23, 1974).
MId. at 5.
02 Id. at 6.
93 Section 5 of the Act, Imn. CoDE § 20-7.5-1-5 (1973), IND'. AxN. STAT. § 28-4555
(Supp. 1974), requires discussion over "working conditions, other than those [which
must be bargained]."
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a compromise for resolution of a mandatory item, is not an unfair
practice. It only becomes an unfair practice when insistence upon a
permissive item is made a condition for agreement on mandatory subjects." This decision was appealed to the IEERB, and the hearing
examiner's decision was approved."
SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS

Problems of Application
The experience to date indicates that in the first year under P.L.
217, bargaining progressed relatively smoothly, or at least without the
need for neutral assistance, in over half the units covered. In the others,
pressure from the employee side of the table to expand scope into the
permissive areas was often apparent. In many if not most such cases
there was determined resistance to this pressure resulting in either an
impasse or the filing of unfair practice charges, or both. One thing is
certain: a great deal of time was spent in fruitless debate or maneuvering over the treatment of discussible items. The frustration and hostility
thus created in many instances pervaded the entire process and made
agreement on mandatory items all the more difficult. Nevertheless, the
figures indicate in the large majority of cases9 8 settlements were reached.
Of course, this says nothing for the degree of satisfaction with the law;
it merely indicates a certain willingness to go along with the differentiation set forth in the law. Nor does it say anything for the degree of
satisfaction with the settlements that were reached.9 7
Substance of Scope
Substance disputes were in general less of a problem than the procedural questions. There were really only two major items which caused
concern. The first is the question of what is meant by "hours" as a
mandatory bargainable item, and the second is whether it was the intent
of the General Assembly to include a grievance procedure as a mandatory
item.
94 Huntington at 5.
9

5 At its meeting on December 12, 1974, the IEERB approved the hearing examiner's
dismissal order in its entirety. The complainant filed for court review on December 31,
1974.
98
6 See notes 31-34 supra & text accompanying.
97 One should approach the first year's statistics with caution when looking to the

future. Both the newness of the bargaining process and unfamiliarity with the impasse
procedures may make these figures unrepresentative for future years. Also, the approach of the current legislative session and the desire to have a good record with Indiana's first public sector bargaining law may have helped to achieve settlements which
might otherwise have been elusive, or at least involved more protracted negotiations.
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The question on the interpretation of hours has been dealt with in
two hearing examiner decisions,"8 the first of which found scheduling
of unpaid vacations and the starting and ending dates in the school
calendar to be discussible. The second decision dealing with work within
the school day found all but unassigned duty-free time to be matters of
assignment rather than bargainable hours. On appeal to the full Board,
the first decision was broadened to make all items of calendar discussible
with only the exceptions of daily working hours and the number of days
to be worked. 9 On the question of preparation time the full Board
agreed with the hearing examiner and approved the decision without
modification." °0
With regard to grievance procedure, the law is unclear on this point.
Section 4, "Subjects of Bargaining," states that the contract may include
a grievance procedure culminating in final and binding arbitration.'
It is clearly permissive with regard to arbitration, but it obviously contemplates that contracts will include grievance procedures. Moreover,
since the duty to bargain is continuous and includes the duty to see that
the contract is implemented in good faith, it makes sense to meet
the continuing obligation by agreeing upon a grievance procedure. Factfinders faced with the question were unanimous in finding grievance
procedure to be a bargainable item.0 2 This is an area, however, where
legislative clarification might be helpful in reducing the number of disputes.
Procedures: The Nature and Extent of the Obligations
The bargaining obligation, as far as table bargaining" 8 is concerned,
was only occasionally misunderstood. Most misunderstandings appeared
to stem from inexperience and were generally in the area of attempting
to establish preconditions to table bargaining or in delays of questionable
validity. Some of the delays, however, were directly related to disagreements with regard to discussion.
S8 Fairfield and Huntington, discussed at notes 83 & 84 .mpa.
99 Minutes of the IEER., Oct. 31, 1974 [on file with the INDIANA LAW JOURNAL].
100 Minutes of the IEERB, Dec. 12, 1974 [on file with the INDIANA LAW JOURNAL],
approving the hearing examiner's dismissal.
101 A contract may also contain a grievance procedure culminating in final and
binding arbitration of unresolved grievances, but such binding arbitration shall
have no power to amend, add to, subtract from or supplement provisions of the
contract.
IND. CODE § 20-7.5-1-4 (1973), IND. ANN. STAT. § 28-4554 (Supl. 1974). See also notes
43 & 82 supra.
108 See note 28 supra.

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[
0
[Vol.
50:284

The discussion obligation is harder to assess since especially in the
first year, when many districts were negotiating a first contract, it would
probably be naive to expect discussion to be meaningfully carried on
before the parties had decided what to include in the contract. One suspects that discussion was not attempted to any great extent in this first
year, and that the potential usefulness of discussion may not even have
been appreciated; however, it is hard to know since only the problem
cases come to the IEERB. Moreover, it may be significant that no new
unfair practice complaints with reference to discussion were filed between the start of school in the fall and December 31, 1974.
The Tippecanoe unfair practice decision 04 underlines the fact that
both parties are obligated to do more than just listen. There must be a
meaningful exchange, and resolution should be sought jointly. The two
discharge cases 0 5 show that discussion is proper and indeed may not be
refused in making personnel decisions covered by section 5 "Subjects of
Discussion." In such cases the employer may not refuse to discuss, nor
may it discriminate against representatives of the bargaining agent for
insisting on their right to discuss and to be present in the discussion of
individual cases if requested by any other member of the bargaining
unit. The hearing examiner explained that there is no conflict between
the duty to discuss and the employer's section 6 rights, since the General
Assembly was merely insisting that the employer hear and discuss both
sides of the story before exercising its section 6 rights.'
The discussion obligation, if it is used, may have considerable impact on the management of employee relations in Indiana schools.
While school employers may be willing to discuss general policies with
the exclusive representative, they may well resist attempts by the exclusive representative to discuss the individual cases of members of the
bargaining unit. The law, however, in section 5 does not distinguish
between individual cases and general procedures in making working
conditions and listed items discussible. Moreover, it will be difficult to
reach agreement on general areas without discussing specific cases.
Thus, discussion may serve the general purpose of exchanging ideas
on policy and program, and at the same time it may fill the role of a griev104 Bobbe June Blom v. Tippecanoe School Corp., [Unfair Practice] Case No. U-7415-7865
(IEERB, July 5, 1974), discussed mepra at notes 45-50, 59.
10 5 Baugo, and Robert Brothers & Board of School Trustees of the Delphi Community School Corp., [Unfair Practice] Case No. U-74-17-0755 (IEERB, Aug. 21, 1974),
discussed supra at notes 51-55, 60-62.
306 Id. Cf. Pennsylvania Lab. Rel. Bd. v. Board of School Directors of the Upper
Merion Area School Dist., [Unfair Practice] Case No. PERA-C-2015-E (Pa. Lab. Rel.
Bd., Sept. 15, 1972), discussed supra note 62.
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ance procedure on nonbargainable working condit.ons. This does not
mean that discussion could or should replace the contractual procedure;
it simply may be used in addition to the contractual procedure on problems which are not covered within the scope of the contract.0 7 When
discussion is used in individual cases as a sort of grkevance procedure, it
will take a high degree of sophistication from both parties to make it
work effectively. For example, from the employer's point of view the
discussion procedure will be less convenient than a grievance procedure
in that the scope of potential grievances is extremely broad and relatively vague since it is not limited by a set of specific provisions and
agreements as would be the case under a contract. On the other hand,
from the employees' point of view, discussion may be less satisfactory
than a grievance procedure in that successful outcomes depend upon a
good working relationship with the superintendent, since under the
section 2(o) definition, the employer may meet its duty to discuss
ilrough its superintendent.'
Unlike most contractual grievance procedures, discussion may start
and end at the top organizational and administrative levels. 9 The
mandate, however, is sufficiently broad to enable parties genuinely interested in resolving their differences to transfer discussions either upward or downward to whatever level may be appropriate under the circumstances. Roughly one-third of negotiated contracts make some
reference to discussion. Some of these contracts include provisions to
ensure open communication with the school board on items which are
being discussed.""
A second point which should be raised is that cffective use of discussion demands that, if after airing a problem and thoroughly discussing
it the parties find that they still disagree, they must be able to accept the
107 Discussion takes on an especially important role whenever the contract narrowly
defines a grievance as a claimed misinterpretation or misapplication of the contract's
terms. Thus, unless covered by a specific provision of the negotated contract, problems
arising in the context of discussible items could not be resolved via the grievance procedure. In this situation, discussion is the only method left for the sharing of ideas
and proposals.
Even where the grievance procedure negotiated extends to a troad range of subjects,
discussion can play an important role. Effective discussion can serve to prevent the misunderstandings which give rise to grievances, thereby creating a more favorable atmosphere for all employment relations. Discussion is ultimately a more cooperative and
positive mechanism for resolving disputes than the grievance procedure, which, of necessity, can be invoked only after the potential for dispute has materialized.
108 INDn. CODE § 20-7.5-1-2(o) (1973), IND. ANN. STAT. § 28-4552(o) (Supp. 1974).
109 A review of the contracts negotiated for 1974-75 does show, however, that in
about 20 districts, building-level discussion is also called for.
110 These figures were compiled based upon a review of 260 contracts (out of 278
negotiated).

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 50:284

fact that agreement is not always possible, and agree to disagree. If the
discussion process is turned into a permanent debating match it will
very quickly destroy a good relationship or prevent one from being
established. If, on the other hand, it is used wisely, it could create a
relationship which will carry over into bargaining and which should be
of great value to both parties.
THE PROGNOSIS

The Experience-Actual Versus Potential
It is too early to assess the kind of working relationship which may
develop under agreements as negotiated and under the continuing obligation to discuss section 5 items. The direction which actual experience
has taken, as opposed to what might have been expected as the potential
result of the dual obligation, is that in this first year the existence of the
dual obligation did not actually operate to reduce the time commitment
and degree of complexity in bargaining the contracts. The division
between the two obligations clearly puts economic items on the bargaining table and working conditions with policy implications into the
realm of discussion. Although discussible items may be included in a
contract, the fact that they need not be so included and the fact that there
is no specific timetable for discussion should create flexibility in dealing
with these matters as they arise, and, over the long term, on items where
greater depth is required to reach a solution than might be afforded
within the framework of conventional economic bargaining.
While the open-ended nature of the discussion obligation may
create some uneasiness, it is dear from unfair practice decisions (at least
at the hearing examiner level) that the IEERB does not regard the
obligation lightly and is looking for more than lip service in seeing that
the discussion obligation is met. If the parties were to take advantage
of good faith discussion-as many may be expected to do under procedures written into their contracts to ensure use of discussion and of
school board input and feedback-then it would seem that far less time
ought to be necessary for bargaining, and proportionately far more time
spent in discussion.
The timetable for bargaining in section 12 was obviously patterned
on time considerations in states with open scope bargaining. One
hundred eighty days to bargain a contract on economic items alone appears to be excessive, particularly since the economic picture is generally
not very clear until at least half of this time has elapsed. This will be
especially true in years such as 1975 when the General Assembly is
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meeting in its biennial long session."' With the property tax freeze,
the state legislature is responsible for the lion's share of new money
available for schools. It seems hardly likely that thi7s sensitive issue will
be settled by late winter when bargaining is slated to begin. Either the
timetable should be amended" 2 or scope should be expanded so that the
parties have something to talk about when they sit down at the table.
A repetition of this year's debates over voluntary expansion of scope
would hardly serve the interests of either party or of the process in
general.
Should Discussion Be Dropped in Favorof Open Scope Bargaining?
It was not really the purpose of this study to argue the merits of
the dual obligation as opposed to open scope bargaining. This is a
question which will doubtless be argued by many who have found this
year's experience unsatisfactory. The purpose of this article has been
to show why this year's experiences may have been unsatisfactory and
to try to show how the dual obligation affected these experiences. One
of the major conclusions drawn is that procedural disputes took up an
inordinate amount of time, and although contracts were eventually
negotiated, substantive discussion has probably been tried only in the
last month or two, if at all.
Whatever happens with regard to scope in the law, a repetition of
the fruitless debates-talking about what will not be talked aboutshould be avoided. Perhaps abandonment of the discussion obligation
and broadening of scope of bargaining is necessary to resolve this
problem. On the other hand, perhaps now that first contracts have been
negotiated and the differentiation between discussible and bargainable
subjects has been applied in practice with possibly some recent experience
in discussion, the second year will progress more smoothly. It is possible
that discussion procedures which have not yet been tried will be used
effectively to the satisfaction of both parties. In theory it could work.
In practice it did not work in the earlier portion of this year because
the importance of discussion was somewhat eclipsed by the more pressing
I'l See note 15 supra.
1 2

The timetable in section 12 of P.L. 217 is inconsistent with the dual obliation180 days seems excessive for the negotiation of monetary items atone. A timetable may
not be necessary at all since the parties are not unaware of buaget deadlines. In any
case, April 15 or May 1 as a mandatory starting date rather than the second week of
February (180 days prior to budget submission) would seem to be more consistent with
the narrow scope approach. The parties should not be forced to spread over 180 days
what could be done (assuming good faith and a desire to reach agreement) in a much
shorter time.
'
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need for a contract. The second year is bound to differ from the first,
if only because half the year need not be spent on representation and unit
determinations. Moreover, the parties have in most instances agreed,
however reluctantly, that certain items be covered by contract and that
others will remain discussible. It is an open question at this point as to
how much discussion will take place and how effective it will be in serving the needs of both parties.
The Dual Obligation and Extended Coverage
Finally, inasmuch as this study lays the groundwork for several
of the major questions which are sure to come up before the General
Assembly in reviewing P.L. 217, there is one more question which should
be raised. If collective bargaining is extended to other groups of public
employees, does the dual obligation make sense? The discussion obligation as an adjunct to bargaining is obviously designed specifically for
professional employees, whose expertise in policy areas cannot be overlooked."' There are many other public sector jobs where such a broad
discussion obligation would probably be inappropriate. In these other
jobs, however, working conditions can be more readily separated from
policy. For example, the secretaries are not likely to try to negotiate
what kind of letters are written or how often, nor are they likely to
want contract clauses on how to handle clientele. They will be much
more interested in take-home pay, benefits, and an equitable grievance
procedure. Under open scope they might also want to talk about the
temperature ifi the building and adequate lighting, but these working
conditions are cost items which also do not have a direct bearing on the
agency. In contrast to secretaries; however, teachers do have the training
and experience to participate in decisions for handling policy questions
and treatment of clientele. Discussion offers latitude in dealing with
these matters. The current obligation to discuss is probably broader
than the obligation to bargain would be even under open scope.
While the dual obligation is unnecessary and probably inappropriate
for nonprofessional employees, it may offer advantages over conventional open-scope bargaining in professional employment. It is hard'to
assess its advantages or disadvantages until it has really been tried.
In the case of nonprofessional employees, or in fact of any other
public employees not yet covered, it does not seem worth all the time
and debate to make the distinction between bargaining and discussion.
In the case of teachers, the time has been put in already and the distinc113 Cf. note 16 supra.
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tion has been made. The questions, still unanswered, are these: having
surmounted the procedural difficulties, will the dual obligation work, and
what are the advantages and disadvantages of making this distinction
at all ?

APPENDIX

1974, BY DATE OF SIGNING
(276 School Corporations)

CONTRACTS NEGOTIATED IN
Contracts Completed Without
Neutral Intervention
In Month

becember
November
October
September

August
July

June
May
April
March

Cumulative Total

Contracts Completed After
Use of Impasse Procedures
In Month

Cumulative Total

All Contracts
In Month

Cumulative Total
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Use of Impasse Procedures in 1974 Collective Bargaining Under P.L. 217
Legend: Diagonal lines: Impasse, resolved through mediation;
Crosshatching: Fact-finding report issued.
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1973-1974 Caseload, by Type
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Legend: long dashes: Open representation cases; solid: Open unfair practice cases;
short dashes: Open mediation cases; dots: Open fact-finding cases.
Closed Conciliation Cases, Unfair Practice Decisions, 1974
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Legend: dashes: Closed mediation;
solid: Closed fact-finding;
dots: Unfair practice decisions.

This grmph shows that mediation
was genermlly completed prior to issuance of unfair practice decisions.
Fact-finding, was well under way, and
the closing3 indicated on the graph
represent the dates of tentative or final agreemnmt on all items in disputeThe imp[lication here is that substantive unfair practice decisions with
regard to szope had little, if any, impact on this year's bargaining.

